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Abstract
We argue that corruption deters international trade by causing delays in exporting and import-
ing, both at customs and in other required administrative procedures. We study three manifesta-
tions of corruption as a barrier to trade. The corruption effect is both significant and economically
sizeable. We first show the negative relationship between the exporters and importers levels of
corruption and trade volumes at the country level in a gravity framework. This country-level
effect implies that a standard deviation increase in the exporters corruption level causes a 27%
drop in exports. We then show that corruption indeed operates through delays: we establish
that this effect stronger in sectors in which goods are more time-sensitive. The magnitude of this
interaction effect is large: a standard deviation increase in the exporters corruption level causes
a decrease in exports ranging from 7% in the least time-sensitive sector to 42% in the most time-
sensitive sector. Finally, we find that corruption also decreases more the probability of positive
trade in sectors in which goods are more time-sensitive. We use unpredictability of sales as our
measure of time-sensitivity. Our results are robust both to controlling for a variety of alternative
explanations and to instrumenting corruption to alleviate concerns of endogeneity.
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1 Introduction
Corruption is often cited as creating obstacles to doing business. Yet, there is little evidence of the
precise mechanisms through which it aﬀects economic activity. In fact, the debate persists between a
view of corruption as "greasing the wheel" of commerce and a view of corruption as a distortionary
tax that decreases economic eﬃciency. This paper provides evidence that corruption acts as a barrier
to international trade and that its deterrent eﬀect is stronger in more time-sensitive sectors. This
evidence corroborates our hypothesis that corruption deters trade through the creation of delays.
We focus on corruption in exporting and importing procedures, including both custom clearance
and other administrative procedures required for trading. Indeed, as shown in a global poll of opinion
leaders published by the World Bank (World Bank, 2003), customs are generally ranked among the
most corrupt government agencies. We argue that corruption at customs, and in other administrative
procedures required for trading, aﬀects trade volumes through the power that oﬃcials have to delay
goods in transit. In eﬀect, corruption may manifest itself as an actual delay or as a bribe payment
exchanged for faster processing. As stated by a Ghana oﬃcial, "delay in customs procedures creates
the opportunity for oﬃcials to request unoﬃcial payments". Clearly, it follows that the delay is more
of an obstacle to trade for goods that are time-sensitive, i.e. goods for which the expected value of
exporting decreases with time delays. As explained by the Secretary General of the Chamber of Trade
and Industry in Benin, "custom oﬃcers often take advantage of merchants’ rush to get their often
perishable products on the market by slowing the process and thereby forcing the businesses to pay
bribes or risk losing profits"3. In other words, potential delays aﬀect trade in time-sensitive products
more, which may translate either in eﬀective delays or in larger bribes being extracted. Micro-evidence
of this latter link between the amount of bribes and the time-sensitivity of a shipment is provided
by Mullainathan and Sequeira, 2007. That paper investigates bribe payments in two ports located
in Southern Africa. The study shows that, when a cargo gets stopped at customs in the exporting
country, the amount of bribes extracted is significantly larger when products are perishable. Based
on this evidence and the considerations above, we expect that corruption has both an average eﬀect
on trade volumes at the country level and a diﬀerentially stronger eﬀect in sectors where goods are
more time-sensitive.
More specifically, our empirical analysis proceeds in three parts as we study three diﬀerent man-
ifestations of the way corruption acts as a barrier to trade. We first show the negative relationship
between both the exporter’s and importer’s levels of corruption and trade volumes in a gravity frame-
work. We use data from Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2005) for corruption levels and from
3Global Integrity Report on Benin, http://www.globalintegrity.org/reports/2006/pdfs/benin.pdf
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the World Trade Flows database for trade volumes. We introduce an extensive set of controls and
instrument for the corruption level to further check the robustness of our results.
We then show that corruption indeed operates through delays: we establish that corruption de-
creases trade volumes more in more time-sensitive sectors. Empirically, we use again a gravity frame-
work, but with exports disaggregated further by exporter, importer and sector. We introduce an
interaction term between the country-level corruption variable and the sector-level time sensitivity
and show that its coeﬃcient is significantly negative. We define time-sensitivity as the rate at which
the expected value of exporting a given good decreases with the total time it takes to produce and
ship it. We proxy for it using the measure of sales unpredictability built in Serfaty - de Medeiros
(2007).
Indeed, in Mullainathan and Sequeira, 2007, time-sensitivity comes from perishability. However,
other sources of time-sensitivity are likely to be more important in our dataset since we are focusing
on trade flows in manufacturing and do not include commodities, or agricultural goods such as cut
flowers or fresh produce4. Namely, there are two other sources of time-sensitivity that authors typically
agree on (see Hummels, 2001): obsolescence and demand unpredictability. Obsolescence is a form of
time-sensitivity since, for example, as new designs come out frequently, the value of a computer chip
decreases fast with its time-to-market (the time from production decision to the final consumer).
Obsolescence is diﬃcult to measure and is likely to be critical only for a handful of sectors where
either the pace of innovation is very high (Computer Equipment, Electronic Components) or where
products are by nature frequently renewed (Newspapers, Periodicals). Hence, we focus on the third
source of time-sensitivity. The existence of unanticipated variations in demand levels is indeed an
important source of time-sensitivity: if by the time a good reaches its market, demand for it has
vanished, its value falls. More generally, if its sales are diﬃcult to predict, the ex ante expected value
of exporting the good decreases with its time-to-market because the forecasting error increases with
that time lag and creates potential over-stocks and under-stocks. Finally, the more unpredictable sales
are, the worse the forecasts, and the faster the value of exporting the good falls with time, i.e. the
larger the time-sensitivity. This mechanism is modeled and explored in Serfaty - de Medeiros (2007).
That paper also builds a measure of unpredictability and shows that indeed this measure influences
the choice of fast vs. slow transportation in international trade, hence validating its use as a proxy
for time-sensitivity.
Finally, we show that corruption also aﬀects the probability of observing positive trade flows
between two given countries in a given sector. Specifically, corruption decreases more the probability
4Among the 114 3-digit SIC sectors included in our analysis, only less than 10 can be classified as litterally perishable.
Bakery, Meat and Dairy Products for sure include mostly perishable products, Beverages include some perishable
products, and Agricultural and Medicinal Chemicals as well.
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of positive trade in sectors in which goods are more time-sensitive. We control for selection in our
previous results and find that the eﬀect of corruption on comparative advantage survives: corruption
aﬀects both selection, and trade volume conditional on selection.
This paper is organized as follows. The remainder of this introduction examines the relationship
of our investigation with the existing literature. The next section, Section 2, further articulates the
motivation for our empirical investigation. Section 3 presents our estimation equations and strategy.
Section 4 introduces the data we use. Section 5 explains our empirical results and Section 6 concludes.
In terms of method and high-level structure of the analysis, this paper naturally inserts itself in
the empirical study of gravity models of trade, of sector-country eﬀects on trade (such as Chor, 2006,
Manova, 2007, Cunat and Melitz, 2007, Nunn, 2007 and Romalis, 2004), and of selection into trade
(such as Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein, 2008). In terms of subject matter, this paper bridges the
literature on time and trade with that on institutions and trade by showing that institutions impact
trade through their eﬀect on delays in administrative procedures.
This paper is related to the literature on timeliness and trade that tries to show how the rate at
which a good’s value decreases with time aﬀects trade patterns. Hummels (2001) uses an empirical
model of the choice of air vs. sea transportation to identify the trade-oﬀ between time saved and
cost across industries. Time-sensitive goods in his framework are goods that are likely to be shipped
by air to save time despite the higher cost. But the good characteristics that lead to this choice are
not investigated, i.e. that paper does not unbundle diﬀerent sources of time-sensitivity. Serfaty -de
Medeiros (2007) takes a diﬀerent approach and shows how sales unpredictability aﬀects the choice
of transportation mode, and hence the distance elasticity diﬀerentially across sectors. We use the
measure of unpredictability built in that paper.
About the eﬀect of delays on trade volume, Djankov, Freund and Pham (2007) show that the overall
time taken by administrative procedures has a negative eﬀect on trade. They also show that the eﬀect
is more pronounced in sectors where goods are more perishable, or where the trade-oﬀ identified by
Hummels indicates a higher willingness to pay for speed. We contribute further by unbundling the
eﬀect of lengthy procedures in place in a particular country from that of corruption. Also, we address
endogeneity of corruption. Finally, we use a model-motivated measure of time-sensitivity that allows
us to interpret precisely our results in terms of a particular source of time-sensitivity.
To the best of our knowledge, while there is a budding literature on institutions and trade, only
very few papers explicitly study the eﬀect of corruption on trade. Anderson and Mercouiller (2002)
study the eﬀect of institution quality on trade. They evoke corruption in the motivation for their
study but do not include a measure of it in their empirical analysis. In contrast, we focus on the eﬀect
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of corruption and find that our results are robust to controlling for a measure of rule of law such as
the ones they use. Nunn (2005) studies the eﬀect of judicial quality on comparative advantage. The
second part of our analysis is conceptually close to his in its structure as we look at the interaction
of a country-level institutional variable, corruption, with a sector-level characteristic, time-sensitivity
and we use related empirical specifications. But the topic is diﬀerent, and we study also the first-order
eﬀect and the eﬀect on selection into trade.
Dutt and Traca (2007) look at corruption at the country-level and their investigation is related
to the first part of our analysis. We add to the country-level analysis by proposing instruments for
corruption. Also, we use the sector−country analysis to determine precisely the channel through
which corruption deters trade.
Finally, we draw from the literature on determinants of corruption when selecting instruments
for corruption. Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) and Ades and Di Tella (1999), for example,
show that natural resource abundance is associated with higher levels of corruption. Following this
literature, we will use a measure of energy production from the World Bank Adjusted Net Savings
database as an instrument for corruption. Further discussion of this instrument as well as of alternative
instruments can be found in subsequent sections.
2 How corruption creates delays that matter for trade
We argue that corruption creates time delays, and hence constitutes a barrier to trade because it
diminishes the expected profit from exporting. We start out thinking of corruption delays as a tax
because goods depreciate, get obsolete, or have uncertain demand. All goods are time-sensitive to
some extent, and bribe extraction along exporting and importing procedures take advantage of that.
Time-related corruption when it comes to custom clearance, or procedures to export or import can
manifest itself as time delays or bribes.5
We first look at country-level exports and expect that they are hampered by the exporter’s and
the importer’s corruption level (both can delay the delivery of goods to final consumers). Yet, at
the country level, corruption can still play out through two diﬀerent channels. The time channel
consists of either time delays or bribes that play on relative patience of the exporter vs. the corrupt
oﬃcial. But either way its eﬀect is stronger on time-sensitive products. If there are additional time
delays, time-sensitive goods lose some of their value by definition. If there is bargaining and a bribe is
5They are typically related in that the corrupt oﬃcial has the possibility to either create a time delay or exchange a
faster process against a bribe.
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extracted in exchange for a reduced time delay, the corrupt oﬃcial can extract more from the exporter
of time-sensitive goods since her outside options diminish quickly with time. As a result, time-related
corruption is equivalent to a tax that is increasing in the time-sensitivity of the traded goods.
But there can be bribes that are independent of the time factor. Some bribes may exist even in the
absence of time-sensitivity. For example, Dutt and Traca (2007) model bribes as essentially related
to the payment of existing tariﬀs in the importing country and independent of time. Such bribes
operate as a tax increasing or decreasing vehicle and their eﬀect across sectors should not correlate
with time-sensitivity.
Hence, it is the variation in the eﬀect of corruption across sectors with diﬀerent degrees of time-
sensitivity that enables us to identify the time channel we are interested in. Specifically, we test
whether the negative eﬀect of corruption on trade flows is stonger in sectors where goods are more
time-sensitive. Since only time-sensitive corruption is equivalent to a tax that is increasing in the
time-sensitivity of the traded goods, this test provides evidence of the time channel.
Let us now precise what we mean by time-sensitivity and how we proxy for it empirically. We
specifically take time-sensitivity to mean that the expected value of exporting a given good decreases
with the total time it takes to produce and ship it. As explained in the introduction, we focus on the
third element of time-sensitivity: sales unpredictability as we think it is both better measured and
more crucial than perishability and obsolescence in our dataset. As shown formally in Serfaty - de
Medeiros, 2007, the more unpredictable sales of a given good are, the faster the expected value of
exports decreases with the time it takes to produce and ship it. Indeed, in the presence of uncertainty
about future demand for a given good, the decision on the quantity produced is based on a forecast
of future sales. The longer the time lag between the decision and the actual sales, the more imprecise
the forecast, and the larger the cost of uncertainty. Indeed, uncertainty is costly to the extent that the
imprecise forecast implies over/under-stocks. So, the expected value of exporting decreases with time.
And the speed at which it does increases with the underlying level of uncertainty. The advantage of
using this measure is that it has been constructed for a large array of sectors using firm-level data
and is clearly interpretable in an explicit theoretical framework. Also, it has been shown to indeed
influence the choice of air vs. sea transportation, implying that it is indeed an empirically important
element of time-sensitivity.
We propose a third test of the eﬀect of corruption in line with the former ones: we expect to find
that corruption also decreases the probability of positive trade, and more so in more time-sensitive
sectors. Indeed we show that in observed trade flows, corruption decreases the value of exporting,
and more so in more time-sensitive sectors. But then we would expect this to be true in unobserved
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trade flows as well. Simply, if the expected value of exporting from country i to country j in sector s
is too low, then we do not observe trade at all in that triplet. Hence, the same explanatory variables
should also explain the selection of triplets into trade.
Finally, some papers have argued that corruption might help "grease the wheel"6 of economic
activity by eﬀectively enabling dynamic economic agents to bypass red tape. The equivalent argu-
ment in our context would be that corruption may actually help expedite the exporting or importing
processes when procedures are lengthy. Corruption might actually be a substitute to eﬃcient proce-
dures in terms of trade facilitation. We do not exclude this possibility a priori, but take an empirical
approach to this question. To explore this argument, we first control for the complexity of procedures.
In unreported results, we also interact the corruption variable with the measure of the complexity of
procedures. If such a mechanism was at play in our data, we would expect that the eﬀect of corruption
would vary with the complexity of procedures in place. We find no evidence to that eﬀect, and hence
conclude that this mechanism is not at play in exporting and importing procedures.
3 Estimation Strategy
In this section, we lay out our empirical framework for each of the three questions that we address:
the eﬀect of corruption on country-level trade flows, the diﬀerential eﬀect of corruption in more time-
sensitive sectors, and its eﬀect on selection into trade.
All of our analysis focuses on trade flows for a particular year (year 2000), as in Chor (2006) and
Cunat-Melitz (2007), because of constraints on data availability. The measure of time-sensitivity is
built for year 2000. This measure is the standard deviation of unpredictable sales and is computed us-
ing quarterly data from COMPUSTAT. Hence, to have enough points to calculate significant standard
deviations, calculations use 10 years of data (1991-2000). One more independent observation could
be built for 1990 using the same methodology (the database starts in 1980). But then, the corruption
data would not be available.
3.1 Country-level tests: first-order eﬀect of corruption
3.1.1 Baseline Specification
We first investigate the eﬀect of corruption using data on trade flows aggregated by exporter- importer
pairs. Our base specification is the following:
6 this phrase is used by Rose-Ackerman, 1997 to describe this particular view of corruption.
7
lnXij = α+ β1orCi + β1destCj + γGij + ζorZi + ζdestZj + εij (1)
where Xij are the total exports from country i to country j, Ci and Cj represent the level of
corruption of, respectively, the origin and destination country. Gij is a vector of pair-wise gravity
variables including distance between the origin and destination countries and a set of dummies: conti-
guity indicates whether both countries have a common border, colony indicates whether the countries
have had a colonial relationship, common language indicates whether they have an oﬃcial or unoﬃcial
language in common. γ is the corresponding vector of coeﬃcients. Zi and Zj are sets of country-level
variables that serve as controls for the characteristics of, respectively, the origin and the destination
country. In our base specification, since we want to identify the eﬀect of corruption at the country
level we do not include country fixed eﬀects7 . Hence, as demonstrated by Anderson and Van Wincoop
(2003), it is crucial that we control for the multilateral resistance terms. Otherwise, our estimates of
the eﬀect of trade barriers would be biased. And since we interpret corruption as a trade barrier, this
would be problematic. We follow Baier and Bergstrand (2001), and proxy for the multilateral resis-
tance term using the log of the PPP price levels in both the country of origin and that of destination,
lnPi and lnPj (they are included in the sets of controls, Zi and Zj).
Beyond controlling for GDP levels8 and democracy levels to ensure that we are really capturing the
independent eﬀect of corruption, our set of controls allows for an interesting interpretation. Indeed,
we control for the complexity of exporting and importing procedures, respectively in the origin and
destination countries (variables are PROCi and PROCj). We use data from the "Doing Business"
report from the World Bank on the number of signatures required by law and regulations respectively
to export and to import. We also control for the general administrative delays in the country using
data from the same source on the number of days needed to start a business. These controls allow us
to isolate an eﬀect of corruption beyond that of administrative complexities of exporting.
We expect to find a negative average eﬀect of corruption on trade (β1or < 0 and β1dest < 0), even
after controlling for signatures. We expect the coeﬃcients on procedure complexity and general delays
to also be negative.
3.1.2 Further Checks
To further check the robustness of our results, we expand our set of controls and instrument the
corruption variable.
7We do introduce, in the Appendix, a set of specifications with importer and exporter fixed eﬀects. Results are
reported in Appendix Table A2 and provide a robustness check.
8We control separately for GDP per capita and population, both in logs.
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Omitted variables First, we check that the eﬀects we find and attribute to corruption are indeed
independent from eﬀects of other variables that are correlated with corruption and also aﬀect trade
volumes. To that end, we add controls for the level of labor market flexibility, FLEX, the level of
financial development proxied by a measure of credit extended to the private sector, FINDEV, and
a measure of the rule of law, LAW . All of these variables have been shown to aﬀect trade flows
at the country-sector level by shaping the pattern of comparative advantage.9 The eﬀects of these
variables at the country level, i.e. their average eﬀects, on a country’s exports have not been the focus
of empirical studies but the magnitude of their second-order eﬀects makes them important controls.
We include levels of each of these three variables, both for the exporter and for the importer. The
subscript i denotes the exporter and the subscript j denotes the importer.
Reverse causality Finally, we are concerned that trade may have an eﬀect on corruption on top
of the eﬀect of corruption on trade. This potential eﬀect of trade on corruption can, a priori, work in
either direction. On the one hand, an increased volume of trade may give a country more incentives
to reduce corruption due to pressure from foreign governments. International institutions have more
leverage when the country trades more given that trade restrictions can be used as a threat. Also,
earlier literature has suggested that trade restrictions generate rents and rent-seeking activities, and
hence are likely to increase corruption (Leite and Weidmann, 1999). On the other hand, corruption,
especially at customs, could increase with trade to the extent that higher volumes of trade imply
larger potential bribes.
We use three diﬀerent instruments to alleviate this concern. First, we use the lagged level of
corruption (in 1996, 4 years earlier), which allows to control for any simultaneous eﬀect of trade on
corruption. Yet, it can still be the case that the past state of institutions for example influenced
both current trade and current corruption. So, we next instrument corruption using the average total
production of oil between 1990 and 1995 (World Bank data), that is before the period that we are
studying. Our choice of instrument follows a growing body of literature, including Sala-i-Martin and
Subramanian (2003) and Ades and Di Tella (1999), showing that indeed natural resource abundance
is associated with higher levels of corruption. This is especially true for "point source" resources such
as oil and minerals because these resources are easy for a small minority to appropriate, and it is
true in our data.10 There is still a concern that the level of production might not be fully exogenous
9Cunat and Melitz (2007) show that a higher degree of labor market flexibility creates a comparative advantage
in sectors that have more volatile firm-level sales. Beck (2003) and Manova (2006) show that a country’s financial
development increases it specialization in sectors that require more outside financing. Finally, Levchenko (2004) and
Nunn (2007) show that countries with stronger legal systems have a comparative advantage in sectors more vulnerable
to hold-up problems from suppliers.
10One idea of the mechanism is that these resources lower the need for tax revenue, which in turn makes citizens less
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since a corrupt government could distort the allocation of resources across diﬀerent sectors of the
economy. Hence, we also instrument using legal origins, which are clearly exogenous. The issue here
is that the exclusion restriction might not be satisfied because legal origins may aﬀect trade through
many channels other than corruption. A large set of controls may capture most of these potential
channels and alleviate this concern, but may also be problematic to the extent that these controls may
be endogenous as well. We take a middle-of-the-road approach to this trade-oﬀ and report results
including our first set of controls only11.
3.2 Country · Sector: Corruption and Comparative Advantage
We now turn to tests of the channel through which corruption deters trade. To confirm our hypothesis
that corruption deters trade through creating delays, we show that corruption decreases trade more
in more time-sensitive sectors.
3.2.1 Baseline specification
We test our hypothesis by estimating the following equation:
lnXijs = β2orCi · Ts + β2destCj ∗ Ts + γGij + ζorZis + ζdestZjs + di + dj + ds + εijs (2)
where Xijs are exports from exporter i to importer j in sector s, (di)i∈I , (dj)j∈J and (ds)s∈S are
respectively sets of exporter, importer and sector fixed eﬀects. Gij is, as before, a vector of pair-
wise gravity variables. Ts denotes sector s level of time-sensitivity. Zis (resp. Zjs) is a vector of
importer (resp. exporter)- sector interactions that serve as controls. In particular, we control for
Hecksher-Ohlin factors, the traditional determinants of comparative advantage.
We now use data on export volumes across triplets of exporter, importer and sector, which allows us
to identify the interaction of the country-level corruption variable with the sector-level time-sensitivity
variable Ts. We expect both coeﬃcients β2or and β2dest to be negative.
The main diﬀerence between our specification and the one used in Rajan - Zingales [1998] and
Romalis [2004] to study comparative advantage is that we keep the variation across destination, and
add importer fixed eﬀects. The variation across destination in our specification allows us to explore
the same country · sector interaction for the importer side as well. That is, we do not only focus on
traditional comparative advantage but a priori think of corruption as a trade barrier that operates
diﬀerentially across sectors with diﬀerent levels of time-sensitivity.
demanding in terms of accountability (Ross, 2001).
11 In Appendix Table A3, we vary this set of controls and see that results are robust.
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3.2.2 Further Checks
Here our concerns are similar to those we discussed at the country level.
Omitted variables We want to make sure that we include other determinants of comparative
advantage that may be correlated to the ones we highlight. As before, we separate out lengthy
procedures from corruption by including a control for PROC interacted with our sector-level variable
TS . We treat bureaucratic delays, the democracy level, the flexibility of the labor market, the level of
financial development and the rule of law similarly.
In addition, we control for the mechanism highlighted in Koren and Tenreyro (2007) according
to which countries at higher levels of development tend to specialize in sectors with lower levels of
productivity volatility. We build a measure of productivity volatility at the sector level and interact
it with the log of GDP per capita.
Reverse Causality The reverse causality problem here is of a slightly diﬀerent nature given that
we control for fixed eﬀects. Indeed, our set of controls ensures that what we are capturing in bβ2 is not
just the eﬀect of the level of corruption on the volume of trade, but the marginal eﬀect of the level of
corruption as time-sensitivity increases across sectors. For simplicity of exposition, let us think of a
case with only two sectors and two levels of corruption. One sector, agricultural chemicals, is highly
time-sensitive and the other, metal cans12, is not. Reverse causality here is an issue to the extent
that an increase in relative demand for chemicals (relative to metal cans) induces both an increase
in relative exports of chemicals and a decrease in the diﬀerence in corruption between highly corrupt
and less corrupt countries. This would be the case if this change in relative demand created incentives
to decrease corruption across the board. But these incentives were higher in highly corrupt countries
because they have more latitude to make such changes. Such reverse causality would imply that trade
of time-sensitive products is particularly strong in low corruption countries (relative to what it is in
high corruption countries), but because it actually causes their lower corruption.
To address this issue, we instrument for the interaction of corruption and time-sensitivity. We
use the same instruments as we used for corruption, but interact them with the measure of time-
sensitivity13 . This way we control for how these variables may aﬀect comparative advantage across
sectors, not just for how these variables may aﬀect overall country-level trade volumes. For the
exclusion restriction to be satisfied we need to further control for channels other than corruption
through which our country-level instrumental variables (lagged corruption, energy abundance and
12These two sectors are among, respectively, the 10 most sensitive sectors and the 10 least sensitive sectors. See
Appendix Table A1.
13This method is also used in Nunn, 2007.
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legal origins) may influence the country × sector patterns of trade. We can do that most eﬀectively
for the energy abundance instrument by using the Hecksher-Ohlin theory. The theory predicts that
a factor’s abundance influences comparative advantage through its interaction with the intensity of
use of this factor in each sector. Hence the main control we use to satisfy the exclusion restriction is
the interaction of energy abundance with a measure of the energy intensity of a sector (calculated as
the ratio of the cost of energy to the value of output). We still present results where we instrument
for lagged corruption since it is a clean way to reduce the simultaneous bias. Also, as we are still
concerned with possible endogeneity of the energy production variable, we present results where we
use legal origins as an instrument. As before, we use an intermediate set of controls.
3.3 Selection
In this section we restrict the sample to US imports, mostly for computational reasons. The possible
number of (sic, importer, exporter) triplets in our full sample is above 3 million observations. Hence
the diﬃculty of implementing linear estimations, and even more so for non-linear estimations such
as probit. Since we cannot identify variation at the importer’s level any more, importer’s variables
are not included in the specification and this section of the analysis focuses exclusively on the eﬀect
of the exporter’s level of corruption. The gravity variables are now captured by the exporter’s fixed
eﬀects.14
As before, we expect to find a negative coeﬃcient for the interaction of the exporter’s corruption
level with the sector’s time-sensitivity.
The selection equation consists of a probit equation where the left-hand side variable, Tis is a
dummy indicating whether we observe positive exports from country i to the US in sector s. The
right-hand side variables are mostly as before. But we now include religion, a variable that has been
shown by Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008) to influence the fixed costs of exporting firms, but
not their export volume conditional on exporting. More precisely, we interact religion with sector
fixed eﬀects, allowing its eﬀect to vary across sectors (this interaction eﬀect is identified even in the
presence of country and sector fixed eﬀects).
Tis = Φ (β2orCi · Ts + ζorZis + ds ·Ri + di + ds + εis) , (3)
where Φ () is the cumulative distribution function of the Normal distribution and ds ·Ri is the interac-
tion of sector fixed eﬀects with the religion variable Ri. The religion variable is an index of similarity
of the religious composition of the population of country i with the US.
14The modified specification for export volumes is reported in the appendix.
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Finally, we run a two-stage Heckman model where we control for selection using the first stage
shown in equation (3) . The religion interaction is excluded in the second stage. It satisfies the exclusion
restriction and allows us to separate the eﬀect of corruption on selection across sector from that of
corruption on trade volume conditional on selection. We expect our results to survive this selection
correction.
4 Data
4.1 Trade Data
Trade data is from the World Trade Flows database, for year 2000. We use data at the SIC 3-digit
level.
Gravity variables are from CEPII. Distance between capitals is our primary measure of distance.
From this database, we also use variables indicating contiguity, common language and the existence
of a former colonial relationship. The variable indicating landlocked countries is from Glick and Rose
(2002).
4.2 Country-Level Data
Main variables
It is particularly diﬃcult to quantify the phenomenon of corruption that is specific to customs
and trade procedures. Following much of the cross-country empirical literature, we focus on indices of
corruption perception that are based on institutional assessments or surveys.15 Our main dependent
variable is the “Control of Corruption” measure from Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2006, hence-
forth KKM), a comprehensive eﬀort that pools together country governance indices from disparate
sources. In all, 31 indices from 25 diﬀerent organizations (such as Gallup International, the World
Bank, and the World Economic Forum) were collected and aggregated using an unobserved component
methodology, yielding an extensive dataset with more than 150 countries, of which 137 are retained in
our dataset. KKM reports scores at two-year intervals for the 1996-2002, and annually therafter (up
to 2005). At the cross-country level, the KKM dataset arguably oﬀers the best coverage, compared to
other corruption perception or rating datasets such as Transparency International’s Corruption Per-
ceptions Index (CPI) and the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG)16, or data on the experience
of corruption. By using a measure of corruption perception instead of experienced corruption data,
15See Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2007) for a detailed response to criticisms against such corruption measures.
16 Svensson (2005) also noted that alternative corruption perception indices highly agree with each other.
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we also take the position that corruption regarding customs and trade exceeds the scope of surveys
that focus on actual, mostly petty corruption experience at the individual level.
The data on exporting and importing procedures is from theWorld Bank "Doing Business" dataset,
and more specifically from the "Trading across Borders" section. Djankov, Freund and Pham (2007)
explain clearly how they explicitly build the measure of number of signatures needed to be exogenous
to corruption. They only retain data that corresponds to an existing regulation.
Capital abundance and skill abundance variables are from Hall and Jones (2001). Skill abundance
is calculated as the average years of schooling in the total population from Barro and Lee (2000).
Controls and Instruments
The measure of the level of democracy we use is the "Polity" variable from the Polity IV database
described in Beck et al. (2000). It ranges between -10 and +10: democratic countries are usually
thought of as those with a polity measure over 5. We use the amount of credit extended by banks
and other intermediaries to the private sector as the measure of financial development. The data
comes from Beck and al (2001). The measure of labor market flexibility is from the "Doing Business"
dataset. The proxy for the rule of law is from Gwartney and Lawson (2004).
The measure of energy abundance is from the World Bank Adjusted Savings Database.17 We
compute an average of energy production for years 1990 to 1995, and take its log. Energy includes
both oil and gas extraction.
Our remaining country level variables, PPP price levels, GDP per capita and population, come
from the PennWorld Tables (PWT 6.0 and 6.1).
4.3 Sector-Level Data
As explained above, we use the measure of unpredictability constructed at the sector level in Serfaty
-de Medeiros (2007) as our measure of time-sensitivity. The measure is built by taking, for each firm
in a given sector, the standard deviation of the unpredictable share of demand. This unpredictable
share is obtained as the residual of a prediction equation including lagged values of sales as well as
quarter fixed eﬀects controlling for seasonal variation. The measure used here for each sector is a
weighted average of the unpredictability for firms in that sector.
This type of data is not available across our large sample of countries (at the needed detailed level
of sectoral disaggregation), so we rely on the commonly used assumption that these needed measures
are intrinsic to sectors and do not vary across countries. We therefore use a reference country, the US,
to measure all these needed sector characteristics. Our analysis restricting the sample to US imports
17The data can be found online at the following url: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEEI/1105643-
1115814965717/21683431/oil_and_gas_rents.xls
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serves as a robustness check that the eﬀects we identify do not rely heavily on this assumption.
Measures of factor intensities at the sector level are computed from variables in the NBER-CES
Manufacturing Industry Database. The capital intensity is computed as the capital per worker and
the skill intensity as the ratio of non-production wages to total wages. Energy intensity equals cost
of energy (electricity and fuel) divided by total shipments.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Examining the Raw Data
We first present summary statistics for all of our variables in Table 1.
5.1.1 Country-level results
We start by looking at whether a country’s corruption level is negatively correlated with its trade vol-
umes in the raw data. Figure 1 plots each country’s aggregate exports (across sectors and destinations)
against its corruption level. Figure 2 is a similar figure for imports.
[INSERT FIGURE 1]
[INSERT FIGURE 2]
The relationship is indeed negative in the raw data for both exports and imports. Magnitudes are
similar, though the regression coeﬃcient in the case of exports is larger at -1.66, compared to -1.33
for imports.
5.1.2 Comparative Advantage
Exports
We now look at whether countries with higher levels of corruption export more in highly time-
sensitive sectors. We start by comparing the share of time-sensitive goods exports across countries
with, respectively, high and low levels of corruption.
We aggregate the data to the level of an exporter-sic pair, adding all exports of a country in a given
sector, across importers. We then look at the percentage of each country’s exports that are in sectors
with an unpredictability level above the median level of 18%. We have 136 countries in the sample
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at this point. On average across all countries, 30% of export volumes take place in sectors with high
unpredictability. We next sort countries into two groups corresponding to high and low corruption
levels. The threshold used is the median level of the corruption index (0.38). We compute the same
average percentage for each group. The average proportion of time-sensitive exports is only 25% in
high corruption countries, whereas it goes up to 35% in low corruption countries: in the raw data,
time-sensitive sectors represent a lower share of exports in countries that are highly corrupt relative
to less corrupt countries.
To look at this in a more continuous way, we also compute the correlation between the country share
of high unpredictability exports and the corruption level. We find a significant negative coeﬃcient of
-0.14, reported in Table 2. Of course, one of our main concern to establish the relationship between
corruption and comparative advantage is to clearly distinguish this channel from the eﬀect of other
variables that are correlated with corruption. For example, are the diﬀerences in corruption levels
really only reflecting diﬀerences in GDP per capita levels? We will systematically control for this
factor, and others, in subsequent sections. For now, a first pass at controlling for GDP per capita
is to purge both variables, the share of time-sensitive exports, and the corruption level, or the eﬀect
of GDP and compute the partial correlation of the residuals. We obtain an even stronger negative
coeﬃcient of -0.32 (Table 2, column (2)): the eﬀect of corruption is even stronger once we control
for the GDP level. This is because GDP per capita actually aﬀects the share of time-sensitive goods
negatively. This alleviates the concern that we are capturing the eﬀect of GDP since both GDP and
corruption aﬀect trade in high-sensitive goods in the same direction but countries with high GDP
typically have low corruption.
Finally, we can also check in the raw data that there is variation in the corruption level within
similar income groups despite the large negative correlation or -0.89 between corruption and GDP
per capita. For example, Hungary and Gabon are respectively at the 25th and 75th percentile of
the distribution of the corruption index, even though they have very similar incomes per capita
(respectively, $11,116 and $10,821). The diﬀerence in the share of their exports that are in highly
time-sensitive sectors is very large: the share is 42% for Hungary vs. only 12% for Gabon. This
suggests that the corruption level impacts the pattern of comparative advantage independently of the
GDP level.
To go deeper into these patterns, Figure 3 shows the relationship between the level of exports of
Hungary in each sector (across destinations) and plots these against the measure of time sensitivity
in each sector.
[INSERT FIGURE 3]
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We see that the relationship is slightly positive. On the contrary, the same relationship is clearly
negative for Gabon, suggesting that indeed the less corrupt country has a comparative advantage in
more time-sensitive sectors.
Imports
We next look at imports and find similar patterns, suggesting that corruption works like a trade
barrier that aﬀects time-sensitive goods the most.
First, the share of imports that are in highly time-sensitive sectors decreases with the corruption
level of the importer. On average across countries, the share is 32%, but it goes down to 28% among
importers with a corruption level above the median while it reaches 35% in low corruption countries.
The diﬀerences go in the same direction as those for exports, though they are smaller.
Panel B of Table 2 presents the correlation between the share of highly time-sensitive imports
and the corruption level of each country. We get a strong negative correlation of -0.36 with the base
variables. Once we purge the variables of the eﬀect of GDP, the correlation is even stronger at -0.44.
Again, we can compare Hungary and Gabon and see that this share is 41% in Hungary vs. 23%
in Gabon.
The graph of the sector import level in each of these country against the sector’s characteristic of
interest, unpredictability, goes in the same direction (see Figure 4). The pattern is diﬀerent than that
for exports, though. In both countries, imports are now increasing in the level of unpredictability.
Yet, the slope is higher in the less corrupt country, Hungary, so that the diﬀerence in imports between
the two countries does indeed increase with time-sensitivity of the sector.
[INSERT FIGURE 4]
This section has shown that in the raw data, corruption works as a trade barrier at the country
level on average across sectors. Moreover, this trade barrier is stronger in sectors that are more
time-sensitive. This pattern remains after our first-pass control for GDP per capita levels.
We now move on to a full-fledged empirical analysis that will allow us to control appropriately for
alternative explanations and to address concerns of endogeneity.
5.2 Corruption and Trade at the Country Level
We start by documenting the first-order eﬀect of corruption on trade flows. We use a gravity frame-
work, with country-level exports as the dependent variables. We have 8217 country pairs in the
sample.
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Gravity Regressions
Here we show that corruption diminishes trade volume beyond the mere eﬀect of complex admin-
istrative procedures in the exporting and importing countries. We find that both the exporter’s and
the importer’s corruption level matter for trade, but that the exporter’s corruption matters more.
We run the specification in equation (1) with varying sets of controls Zi and Zj and report results in
Table 3, columns (1) through (5).
In regression (1) of Table 3, we include usual gravity equation controls. The eﬀect of corruption
is sizeable. The corruption measure is normalized to have a standard error of 1. So a one standard
deviation increase in the exporter’s corruption level decreases log exports by -.31, i.e. it decreases ex-
ports by 27%. Similarly, a one standard deviation increase in the importer’s corruption level decreases
exports to that country by 12%.
All controls have the expected signs and magnitudes for the gravity variables are in line with other
studies.
Next, in regression (2) , we control for the number of signatures needed to export as well as for the
dynamism of the business environment (using the number of days to start a business) and the level of
democracy. The number of signatures needed to export and import is a very direct measure of how
complex and time-consuming the exporting procedures are. Hence, it allows us to distinguish between
the eﬀect of generally complex and long procedures and the eﬀect of corruption. We see that the eﬀect
of corruption is still significant with this control, and at -0.41 for the exporter’s corruption and -0.07
for the importer’s variable, not significantly diﬀerent from the previous estimates. The importer’s
corruption variable is less significant. This implies that the eﬀect of corruption does not just capture
the fact that procedures themselves are more lengthy in more corrupt countries. Instead, corruption
adds to the time it takes.18
Complex procedures have a significant negative eﬀect on trade flows. The coeﬃcients imply that
a standard deviation increase in the number of signatures required to export (respectively import)
causes a 29% (resp. 14%) decrease in trade. So, after standardizing, the eﬀect of the exporter’s
signatures is about twice as strong as that of the importer’s.
The delays in starting a business come out insignificant, suggesting that it is indeed delays in
18 It can be argued that, in the long run, lengthy procedures might be put in place because of corruption, because they
would increase the potential for corruption. First, this endogeneity happens over time and we are using simultaneous
measures. Secondly, there is no evidence in our data that the eﬀect of corruption on trade, and on time, is indeed larger
when procedures are lengthier. Thirdly, even if complex procedures are endogenous to corruption, we are still capturing
the direct eﬀect of corruption and distinguishing it from the indirect eﬀect through that complexity of procedures.
Finally, we also control for the level of democracy in the same regression, which could determine both corruption and
the complexity of procedures.
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exporting procedures that matter, and not the general "slowness" of bureaucratic procedures in the
country. The level of democracy of the exporting country comes out strongly significant and positive.
Robustness
In regressions (3) to (5) , we control for additional variables that are correlated with corruption
to check that the eﬀect of corruption that we find is independent. We add controls for labor market
flexibility and the level of financial development in column (3) . We find that both labor market
flexibility and the rule of law have a positive influence on trade. Yet, while the point estimate for the
exporter’s corruption diminishes slightly, the coeﬃcient is still not significantly diﬀerent from that in
column (1) . Given the strong negative correlation of -72% between corruption and the level of financial
development in the cross-section, the fact that corruption remains strongly significant suggests that
it does indeed have an eﬀect strongly independent from that of financial development. The eﬀect
of the importer’s corruption, though, is less robust: as it diminishes, it looses significance. We then
add controls for the rule of law in column (4) . That variable is even more correlated with corruption
(the correlation is -91%), hence this is a hard test to pass. Indeed, the coeﬃcient on the exporter’s
corruption diminishes further, but it remains significant. We finally combine all of these controls in
column (5) and check that our coeﬃcient, while smaller, is significantly negative.
Overall, our results for the exporter’s corruption are robust to an extensive set of controls. The
results for the importer’s corruption are less clear-cut, but robust to our first set of controls.
Instrumental Variable Estimation
We are concerned about reverse causality and instrument corruption using three diﬀerent instru-
ments. Results are reported in Table 4.19
Since our instruments are available for a somewhat smaller part of our sample, we first run again
our base specification, equation (1) , on that sub-sample. The results are very similar to its full-sample
counterpart, column (2) of Table 3.
We start by instrumenting the corruption level using a four-year lag of corruption for the exporter
and the importer. We report the results from the IV estimation in column (2) , followed by the
first stage for the exporter’s corruption variable Ci (Ci is the dependent variable) and that for the
importer’s corruption variable. Unsurprisingly, lagged corruption comes out very significant and with
a coeﬃcient close to 1 in both first stage regressions. Yet, the coeﬃcient is significantly lower than 1,
implying that there is variation in corruption that remains unexplained by lagged corruption. Results
from the IV in column (2) confirm our baseline results. Both coeﬃcients for exporter’s and importer’s
19All regressions include the gravity variables Gij as well as the price levels, GDP and population variables, but we
do not report coeﬃcients for them since they are all as expected and we want to focus on the instrumentation.
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corruption are negative and similar to those in column (1) , even though significance is decreased for
the importer’s corruption. So, when we rule out simultaneous reverse causality (i.e. the eﬀect of trade
in 2000 on corruption in 2000), corruption still deters trade.
We then instrument using energy production and report results in a similar fashion in columns (5)
to (7). The exporter’s corruption’s coeﬃcient increases substantially, but the standard error does too,
so that the diﬀerence just passes a test of significance at the 5% level. The first stage regressions are
as expected, with the energy production predicting corruption positively, with significant coeﬃcients.
In the exporter’s corruption first stage, the coeﬃcient of 0.04 implies that when the energy production
increases by one standard deviation, corruption increases by .54 points, i.e. slightly over half a standard
deviation. The eﬀect is substantial since corruption ranges from -2.5 to 1.5.
Lastly, we instrument using legal origin dummies. The first stage is as expected. We exclude the
Scandinavian legal origin dummy and find that, relative to those, all other possible origins increase
corruption. British origin causes the least increase, and Socialist origin the most, with German and
French origins in the middle. Again, the coeﬃcient for the exporter’s corruption is strengthened with
a larger magnitude and is still significant at the 1% level. The coeﬃcient on the importer’s corruption
on the other hand becomes insignificant, suggesting that it was driven by reverse causality.
Finally, instrumenting for corruption using a variety of instruments, our results overall are con-
firmed, even though in two cases the coeﬃcient on the importer’s corruption level becomes insignificant.
We conclude from the results in Tables 3 and 4 that indeed the corruption level of the exporter and
of the importer decreases trade volume, even after introducing a large set of controls and instrumenting.
The eﬀect of the exporter’s variable is both larger and more robust. We next move to the estimation
of the diﬀerential eﬀect of corruption across sectors that will allow to determine more precisely the
channel through which corruption operates.
5.3 Corruption and Comparative Advantage
Here we test our predictions in a sector-level gravity framework. We report results for the specification
in equation (2) , with a varying set of controls, in Table 5.
In regression (1) , we control for Hecksher-Ohlin factors, the traditional comparative advantage
factors and still find significant eﬀects for the interactions of corruption with time-sensitivity. The
coeﬃcient for exporter’s corruption though is much higher than the importer’s one. We also find
significant coeﬃcients for the interaction of a country’s factor abundance with the corresponding
sector factor intensity. The coeﬃcients for all three factors are positive and significant, confirming the
Hecksher-Ohlin theory. The coeﬃcient of -1.38 on the first interaction of exporter’s corruption with
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sector level unpredictability means that the exporter’s corruption decreases trade more in sectors with
a higher level of unpredictability. For a level of unpredictability at the 25th percentile, one standard
deviation increase in the exporter’s corruption implies a 11% decrease in trade. In contrast, for a level
of unpredictability at the 75th percentile, one standard deviation increase in the exporter’s corruption
implies a 22% decrease in trade. Over the whole range of unpredictability, the eﬀect of a standard
deviation’s increase in the exporter’s corruption ranges from -7% to -42%.
Similarly, over the whole range of unpredictability, the eﬀect of a standard deviation’s increase in
the importer’s corruption ranges from -2% to -17%.
When standardizing these coeﬃcients to capture the eﬀect of a simultaneous standard deviation
increase in each variable of the interaction, we find that the eﬀect of the exporter’s corruption on
comparative advantage is -.08, about twice smaller than that of the capital and schooling factors
(respectively 0.22 and 0.17) and twice larger than that of the energy factor (0.04). The standardized
coeﬃcient for the importer’s corruption interaction eﬀect is -0.03. We conclude from this exercise that
the eﬀects of corruption on the cross-sectoral patterns of trade are of the same order of magnitude,
though smaller, than the eﬀects of the Hecksher-Ohlin factors.
In regression (2) , we add our first set of controls for corruption and interact them with the sector-
level variable Ts. Our result is robust and the point estimate is roughly unchanged.
Robustness
Columns (3) to (7) expand the set of controls to explore the robustness of the results. The coeﬃ-
cient on the interaction of the exporter’s corruption with time-sensitivity is by and large unchanged.
Yet, the coeﬃcient on the importer’s interaction becomes insignificant and very close to 0 in terms of
point estimate. It seems that the eﬀect of importer’s characteristics across sectors is fully captured by
the complexity of importing procedures whereas on the exporter’s side, the exporting procedures also
matter but the corruption level matters beyond that (the corruption eﬀect is actually twice stronger
when comparing standardized coeﬃcients).
In column (6) , we test for the theory in Koren and Tenreyro, 2007, according to which countries
at higher levels of development tend to specialize in sectors that are less volatile in terms of their
productivity. We do find this negative eﬀect, but our coeﬃcient of interest remains unchanged. We also
control in the same regression for an interaction of the exporter’s corruption with the sector’s volatility
measure to check that our time-sensitivity is not capturing the aggregate volatility of productivity.
Our result that corruption of the exporter decreases trade more in more time-sensitive sector is
clear and robust to our large set of controls. Corruption creates a comparative disadvantage in time-
sensitive goods. On the importer’s side, if there is an eﬀect of corruption, it seems to be mostly
operating through the complexity of importing procedures.
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Instrumental Variable Estimation
Here again, there may be a reverse causality issue. Table 6 presents results of the instrumentation.
Since these are the results that are significant in Table 5, we focus on the exporter’s variable, i.e. on the
interaction of the exporter’s corruption level with the sector time-sensitivity. Hence, the specification
is essentially the same as that in equation (2) , but without the Cj∗Ts and Zjs terms and instrumenting
for Ci ∗ Ts by an interaction Ii ∗ Ts.
The table is organized in a way similar to Table 4, except that there is only one first stage regression
for each IV specification. All first stages are as expected, with strongly significant coeﬃcients on the
instruments and large R-square. The coeﬃcient of interest, β2or, is larger (in absolute value), but
not statistically diﬀerent when we instrument using lagged corruption or energy production. It does
increase significantly when instrumenting with legal origins.
5.4 Corruption, Comparative Advantage, and Selection
In this section we restrict the sample to US imports mostly for computational reasons. The possible
number of (sic, importer, exporter) triplets is above 3 million observations. Hence the diﬃculty of
implementing linear estimations, and even more so for non-linear estimations such as probit.
Concomitantly, this sample restriction also serves the purpose of checking that our results are
robust in this sub-sample. Given that the measure of time-sensitivity, Ts, is built using US data, the
restriction to US imports is of particular significance. The regression now includes only exporter and
sector fixed eﬀects since there is only one importer. We only control for exporter variables interacted
with sector-level variables. Results are reported in Table 7.
Column (1) shows results from gravity equation (6) with exports as the dependent variables.
We see that the coeﬃcient on the interaction of the exporter’s corruption (-1.63) with the sector’s
unpredictability is close to that found in Table 5 (standard errors are larger due to the smaller number
of observations). So the results shown previously are robust to restricting the dataset to US imports
only.
Column (2) shows results from the probit equation (3) where the dependent variable is a dummy
equal to 1 when a given exporter-sector pair has strictly positive trade with the US, 0 otherwise. We
report marginal eﬀects. The coeﬃcient of -0.27 translates into corruption decreasing the probability
of positive trade by 1% to 10% across the range of sector-level unpredictability.
Column (3) presents results of a two-stage Heckman estimation that controls for selection (the first
stage is the probit from column (2)). We see that the coeﬃcient of interest, β2or, is very close and not
significantly changed, at -1.68 and is still significant at the 5% level (the standard error has decreased
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slightly). Hence, we conclude that the eﬀect we find in the data is not attributable to selection bias. In
sum, corruption aﬀects both the extensive margin of trade (the selection into trade) and the intensive
one (the volume traded across selected sectors).
Robustness
Columns (4) to (6) repeat the same three specifications but with more controls. The magnitudes
of coeﬃcients found in columns (1) to (3) are robust to adding our first set of controls even though
the coeﬃcient becomes less significant in the probit selection equation.
In sum, we can conclude from this section that corruption influences selection into exporting
diﬀerentially across sectors: it decreases the probability for country i of trading in sector s more for
time-sensitive sectors. Also, we have provided evidence that this selection process does not cause a
bias in our estimation of the eﬀect of corruption on comparative advantage.
Finally, we have shown that corruption decreases the average level of both imports and exports
of a given country. This deterring eﬀect on exports is stronger in more time-sensitive sectors and
manifests itself both across exporter, importer, sector triplets with positive trade and in the selection
of triplets into this positive trade.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have shed light on the link between time delays and corruption levels, once controlling
for relevant institutional features and for the inherent complexity of the procedures. First, our results
imply that corruption plays an important role in shaping aggregate country-level export and import
volumes. As such, our findings provide evidence of a novel channel through which corruption has
a detrimental eﬀect on economic activities, as reviewed by Lambsdorﬀ (1999). Corruption inhibits
exports and imports, hence may impede international market integration, thus slow down the catch-up
process of low income countries (as in Barro and Sala-i-Martin).
Secondly, our results show that more corrupt countries are at a comparative "disadvantage" to
export more time-sensitive goods and that corruption also plays out in selection into trading. These
results contribute to the understanding of the relationship between institutions and trade by highlight-
ing a specific channel through which an institutional feature of countries, corruption, aﬀects trade.
Corruption creates a comparative disadvantage in time-sensitive sectors, confirming that it does indeed
deter trade through causing additional delays.
In a broader perspective, our results add to the current policy debate on non-tariﬀ barriers to
trade. They suggest that in terms of trade facilitation, merely simplifying exporting procedures is
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not a substitute to decreasing corruption levels. Changing regulations may be an important step, but
corruption definitely hinders trade well beyond the eﬀect of cumbersome regulations.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Country-level regressions with fixed eﬀects
7.1.1 Specification
As a robustness check for the country-level regressions, we also include a specification where we do
have country fixed eﬀects, which takes care of the multilateral resistance term in a more definite
way. First, we include only a set of importer’s fixed eﬀects, (di)i∈I , where, for each i, di is a dummy
indicating country i. In that specification, the importer’s variables are not identified any more. But
the pair-wise gravity variables and the exporter’s variables are, so we include them:
lnXij = α+ β1orCi + γGij + ζorZi + di + εij . (4)
Hence, we obtain an alternative estimate for β1or. We expect this alternative estimate to not diﬀer
substantially from the previous one.
We then run a symmetric specification with a set of exporter’s fixed eﬀects, (dj)j∈J , and all of the
importer’s variables (Ci) and controls (Zi) and obtain an estimate for β1dest.
Then, in a third specification, we include both set of fixed eﬀects di + dj . Hence, the eﬀect of
corruption in country i and of corruption in country j are not identified separately any more. Instead,
we include a variable indicating whether the corruption level is above the median corruption level in
at least one of the two countries, HCij :
lnXij = α+ β1HHCij + γGij + di + dj + εij . (5)
This specification serves to check that we get a negative eﬀect of corruption, i.e. a negative sign
for dβ1H , even after introducing both exporter and importer fixed eﬀects.
7.1.2 Results
Results are reported in Appendix Table A2. We first test the specification outlined in equation
(4) , where we introduce respectively, importer’s and exporter’s fixed eﬀects. Results are reported in
columns (1) and (2). Coeﬃcients on both the exporter’s and the importer’s levels of corruption are
essentially unchanged.
As a last control, we test equation (5) , which features both importer and exporter fixed eﬀect.
The coeﬃcient of interest now has a diﬀerent interpretation: we are testing whether trade is lower
when at least one of the countries has a corruption level above the median. We find indeed a negative,
significant, coeﬃcient of -0.23.
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7.2 Gravity specification on restricted sample
Here, we report the specification used in the first and fourth columns of Table 7. It consists of a gravity
equation for sector-level exports on the sample of US imports only. Since the importer does not vary
in the sample, the export volume specification is modified accordingly. It now excludes importers’
variables as follows:
lnXis = β2orCi · Ts + ζorZis + di + ds + εis, (6)
where di and ds denote respectively country and sector fixed eﬀects.
The coeﬃcient β2or captures, again, the eﬀect of corruption on comparative advantage.
26
References
[1] Ades, A. and R. Di Tella, 1999, "Rents, Competition and Corruption", American Economic
Review 89(4): 982-993.
[2] Anderson, J.E., and D. Mercouiller, 2002, "Trade, Insecurity and the Home Bias", Review of
Economics and Statistics, 84 (2), pp.345-52.
[3] Anderson, James, and Eric van Wincoop, 2003, “Gravity with Gravitas: A Solution to the Border
Problem”, American Economic Review 93: 170-192.
[4] Aslaksen, Silje, "Corruption and Oil: Evidence from Panel Data", Norwegian University of Sci-
ence and Technology mimeo.
[5] Baier, S. and J.H. Bergstrand, 2001, "The Growth of World Trade: Tariﬀs, Transport Costs and
Income Similarity", Journal of International Economics, 53 (1), pp. 1-27.
[6] Barro, R.J. and J.W. Lee, 2000, “International Data on Educational Attainment Updates and
Implications,” NBER Working Paper 7911.
[7] Bartelsman, Eric J., Randy A. Becker, and Wayne B. Gray, 2000, NBER-CES Manufacturing
Industry Database, NBER and U.S. Census Bureau.20
[8] Beck,Thorsten, George Clarke, Alberto Groﬀ, Philip Keefer, and Patrick Walsh, 2001, "New
tools in comparative political economy: The Database of Political Institutions." 15:1, 165-176
(September), World Bank Economic Review.
[9] Beck, Thorsten, Asly Demirguc-Kunt, and Ross Levine, 2000, “A New Database on Financial
Development and Structure,” World Bank Economic Review 14: 597-605.
[10] Chor, Davin, 2007, "Unpacking Sources of Comparative Advantage: A Quantitative Approach",
Harvard University mimeo.
[11] Cunat, Alejandro, and Marc J. Melitz, 2007, “Volatility, Labor Market Flexibility, and Compar-
ative Advantage”, NBER Working Paper, No. 13062.
[12] Djankov, Simeon, Caroline Freund and Cong S. Pham, 2006, "Trading on Time", World Bank
Policy Research Working Paper, No. WPS3909.
[13] Djankov, S., R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes and A. Shleifer, 2002, "The Regulation of Entry",
Quaterly Journal of Economics. 117(1): 1-37.
20http://www.nber.org/nberces/
27
[14] Dutt, Pushan and Daniel Traca, 2007, "Corruption and Bilateral Trade Flows: Extortion or
Evasion?", INSEAD Singapore / Universite Libre de Bruxelles mimeo.
[15] Feenstra, Robert C., Romalis, John and Schott, Peter K., 2002, "U.S. Imports, Exports, and Tariﬀ
Data, 1989-2001" NBER Working Papers, No. 9387, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[16] Francois, J. and Manchin, M., 2007, "Institutions, Infrastructure and Trade", CEPR Working
Paper.
[17] Glick and Rose, 2002, "Does a currency union aﬀect trade? The time-series evidence", European
Economic Review, Vol. 46, Issue 6, pp. 1125-1151.
[18] Gwartney, James, and Robert Lawson, 2004, "Economic Freedom of the World: 2004 Annual
Report", Vancouver: The Fraser Institute. Data from www.freetheworld.com.
[19] Hall, Robert, and Charles Jones, 1999, “Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output
Per Worker Than Others?” Quarterly Journal of Economics 114: 83-116.
[20] Helpman, Elhanan, Marc Melitz and Yona Rubinstein, 2008, "Estimating Trade Flows: Trading-
Partners and Trading Volumes", Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 123, No. 2, Pages 441-487.
[21] Heston, Alan, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, 2006, "Penn World Table Version 6.2", Center
for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylva-
nia.
[22] Hummels, David, 2001, "Time as a Trade Barrier", Purdue University mimeo.
[23] Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi, 2005, “Governance Matters IV: Gover-
nance Indicators for 1996-2004,” World Bank Policy Research Department Working Paper 3630.
[24] Koren, M. and S. Tenreyro, 2007, “Volatility and Development,” The Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, Vol. 122, No. 1: 243-287.
[25] Lambsdorﬀ, Johann Graf, 1999, "Corruption in Empirical Research - A Review", Transparency
International Working Paper.
[26] La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and R. Vishny, 1998, "Law and Finance." Journal
of Political Economy 106, p.1113-55.
[27] Leite, C. and J. Weidmann, 1999, "Does mother nature corrupt? Natural resources, corruption,
and economic growth", IMF Working Paper No. 99/85.
28
[28] Levchenko, Andrei, 2004, “Institutional Quality and International Trade”, IMF Working Paper,
No. 04/231.
[29] Manova, Kalina, 2006, "Credit Constraints, Heterogeneous Firms and International Trade", Har-
vard University mimeo.
[30] Mullainathan, Sendhil. and Sandra Sequeira, 2007,"The Long Way Around: Studying the Real
Consequences of Corruption in Transport", Harvard University mimeo.
[31] Nunn, Nathan, 2007, "Relationship-Specificity, Incomplete Contracts and the Pattern of Trade",
forthcoming in the Quarterly Journal of Economics.
[32] Romalis, J., 2004, “Factor Proportions and the Structure of Commodity Trade,” American Eco-
nomic Review, 94(1), pp. 67-97.
[33] Rose-Ackerman, R. (1997). "The political economy of corruption". In K.A. Elliott (Ed.), Cor-
ruption and the global economy, 31-60. Washington DC: Institute for International Economics.
[34] Ross, M. L., 2001, "Does oil hinder democracy?", World Politics 53, pp.325-361.
[35] Sala-i-Martin, X. and A. Subramanian, 2003, "Addressing the Natural Resource Curse: An
Illustration from Nigeria", NBER Working Paper 9804 (June).
[36] Serfaty - de Medeiros, Karine, 2007, "Demand Shocks, Transportation Mode and the Distance
Elasticity of Trade Flows", Harvard University mimeo.
[37] Svensson, J., 2005, “Eight Questions about Corruption”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol.
19, pp. 19-42.
[38] Transparency International, 2005, "The Global Corruption Barometer", Transparency Interna-
tional Policy and Research Department, Berlin, Germany.
[39] World Bank, 2003, "The Global Poll: Multinational Survey of Opinion Leaders", Washington,
DC, World Bank.
29
Figure 1. Bilateral Exports and Exporter’s Corruption
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Figure 2. Bilateral Imports and Importer’s Corruption
ZAF
DZAMAR
SDN
TUN
EGY
CMR
COG
GAB
AGO
BDI
ETH
GMB
GHA
GIN
CIV
KEN
MDG
MWIMLI MRT
MUS MOZ
NER
NGA
GNB
RWA
SEN
SLE
ZWE
TGO
UGA
TZA
BFA
ZMB
CAN
USA
ARG
BOL
BRA
CHL COL
ECU
MEX
PRY
PER
URY
VEN
CRI
SLV
GTM
HND
NIC
DOM
HTI
JAM
TTO
GUY
PAN
ISR
JPN
BHR
CYP
IRN
JOR
KW
LBNOMN
SAU
SYR
ARE
TUR
YEM
BGD
KHM
LKA
IND
IDN
KOR
LAO
CHN
MYS
NPL
PAK
PHL
SGP
THA
AZE
ARM
GEO
KAZ
KGZ
TJK
TKM
UZB
CHN
MNG
VNM
BEL
DNK
FRA
DEU
GRC
IRL
ITANLD
PRT
ESP
GBR
AUT
FIN
ISL
NOR
SWE
CHE
ALB
BGR
BLR
CZE
EST
HUN
LVALTU
MDA
POL
ROM
RUS
SVK
UKRHRV
SVN
MKD
AUS
NZL
PNG
10
12
14
16
18
20
A
vg
 (l
og
) i
m
po
rt
s 
pe
r s
ec
to
r 
an
d 
de
st
in
at
io
n
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2
Coeff= -1.33*** (.13), R-squared=.43, N=135
30
Figure 3. Hungary vs. Gabon: Sector-level Exports
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The graph plots the average volume of Hungary and Gabon exports in each sector against the level of
time sensitivity in the sector. The countries have been chosen to have similar GDP per capita levels
but Hungary has a much lower corruption level.
Figure 4. Hungary vs. Gabon: Sector-level Imports
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The graph plots the average volume of Hungary and Gabon imports in each sector against the level of
time sensitivity in the sector. The countries have been chosen to have similar GDP per capita levels
but Hungary has a much lower corruption level.
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Observations Mean St. dev. Min Max
Corruption (KKM) 136 0.01 1.04 -2.49 1.52
GDP per capita (ln) 160 8.52 1.17 6.01 10.51
Population (ln) 164 9.04 1.86 3.66 14.04
Signatures required to export 119 9.92 8.50 1.00 40.00
Signatures required to import 118 14.66 14.79 1.00 75.00
Days to start a business 128 0.23 0.18 0.00 1.00
Polity 129 3.46 6.60 -10.00 10.00
Labor market flexibility 139 0.64 0.17 0.22 1.00
Financial development 138 0.39 0.39 0.02 1.92
Rule of law 120 0.50 0.24 0.00 1.00
PPP Price level (ln) 164 3.65 0.62 2.13 5.05
Average years of schooling 121 4.77 2.77 0.54 12.04
Capital abundance (ln) 116 9.25 1.56 5.76 11.59
Energy abundance (ln) 101 0.07 0.16 0.00 0.98
Mean Unpredictability 114 14.9% 5.5% 5.3% 40.3%
Productivity volatility 115 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.19
Skill intensity (ln) 115 -0.97 0.33 -1.77 -0.12
Capital intensity (ln) 115 4.17 0.82 2.20 6.71
Energy intensity (ln) 115 -4.22 0.83 -6.26 -1.69
Sector-level variables (3-digit SIC codes)
Country-level variables
Table 1
Summary Statistics
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Baseline Purged Baseline Purged
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Exports
Exporter's corruption -0.14**
(0.07)
Exporter's corruption (purged) -0.32*
(0.18)
N 136 134
Panel B: Imports
Importer's corruption -0.36***
(0.07)
Importer's corruption (purged) -0.44**
(0.19)
N 135 133
Table 2
Correlation between Corruption and the Share of Time-Sensitive Trade
Share of Time-Sensitive Trade Flows
Exports Imports
Purged variables are purged of the effect of the log GDP of the exporter by first 
Standard errors of correlation estimates in parenthesis.
Correlation coefficients are reported. 
regressing them on that variable and taking the residual.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
X corruption -0.31*** -0.40*** -0.27*** -0.18*** -0.13**
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06)
M corruption -0.13*** -0.07* -0.01 0.00 -0.04
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06)
ln(XGDPpc) 1.44*** 1.24*** 1.18*** 1.13*** 1.04***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
ln(MGDPPC) 0.80*** 0.80*** 0.76*** 0.80*** 0.75***
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
ln(Xpop) 1.01*** 1.04*** 1.00*** 1.03*** 0.99***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
ln(Mpop) 0.75*** 0.76*** 0.81*** 0.76*** 0.82***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Distance -0.97*** -1.00*** -1.10*** -0.99*** -1.10***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Contiguity 0.93*** 0.80*** 0.67*** 0.62*** 0.51***
(0.14) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Colony 0.86*** 0.64*** 0.59*** 0.55*** 0.50***
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Common Language 0.62*** 0.72*** 0.63*** 0.78*** 0.67***
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
X Landlocked -0.16*** 0.02 -0.11 -0.16** -0.28***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
M landlocked -0.57*** -0.49*** -0.54*** -0.58*** -0.59***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
X Signatures to export -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
M Signatures to import -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
X Days to start a business 0.17 0.58*** 0.75*** 1.00***
(0.15) (0.16) (0.17) (0.18)
M Days to start a business 0.10 0.37** 0.36** 0.49***
(0.15) (0.16) (0.17) (0.18)
X Polity 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
X Polity 0.01* -0.01 0.01* -0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
X Labor Flex 0.65*** 0.58***
(0.15) (0.16)
M Labor Flex 0.54*** 0.52***
(0.14) (0.15)
X Fin. Devt 0.76*** 0.81***
(0.07) (0.07)
M Fin. Devt 0.54*** 0.56***
(0.08) (0.08)
X Rule of Law 1.72*** 1.15***
(0.28) (0.28)
M Rule of Law 0.64*** 0.00
(0.25) (0.25)
X ln(price level) 0.18*** 0.13** 0.02 0.08 0.05
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
M ln(price level) 0.71*** 0.85*** 0.70*** 0.79*** 0.72***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
Exporter fixed effects No No No No No
Importer fixed effects No No No No No
R square 65.8% 68.8% 73.1% 69.8% 74.0%
N 8217 6506 5819 5830 5370
Standard errors are clustered by country pair.
Country-level log(exports) lnXij
Table 3
Country-level Gravity Equation: Corruption as a First-Order Barrier to Trade
Base specification Robustness checks
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Benchmark
Restricted IV IV
Sample lnX X Corr. M Corr. lnX X Corr. M Corr.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
X corruption -0.46*** -0.57*** -0.96***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.15)
M corruption -0.09** -0.08* -0.05
(0.04) (0.04) (0.19)
X lag Corruption 0.83*** 0.00
(0.01) (0.00)
M lag Corruption 0.00 0.89***
(0.01) (0.00)
X Energy Production (log) 0.04*** 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
M Energy Production (log) 0.00 0.03***
(0.00) (0.00)
X Signatures to export -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.01*** 0.00 -0.03*** 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
M Signatures to import -0.01** -0.01** 0.00 0.00 -0.01** 0.00 0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
X Days to start a business 0.27* 0.37** 0.07*** 0.00 0.77*** 1.02*** 0.02
(0.15) (0.16) (0.03) (0.02) (0.21) (0.04) (0.05)
M Days to start a business 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.02 1.10***
(0.16) (0.16) (0.02) (0.02) (0.24) (0.05) (0.04)
X Polity 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.00 0.00 0.02*** 0.00*** 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
X Polity 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00*** 0.01 0.00 0.00***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
R square 68.7% 68.6% 95.1% 97.3% 67.9% 81.1% 81.0%
N 5474 5474 5474 5474 5474 5474 5474
as well as for the GDP per capita, population, and price levels in each country.
Table 4
Country-level Gravity: Instrumental Variable Estimation
Energy Production as InstrumentCorruption Lagged as Intrument
1st stage 1st stage
Standard errors are clustered by country pair.
All equations have controls for the Distance, Contiguity, Colony, Common Language and Landlock variables 
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Benchmark
Restricted IV
Sample lnX X Corr. M Corr.
(1) (8) (9) (10)
X Corruption -0.46*** -1.18***
(0.04) (0.10)
M Corruption -0.09** -0.10
(0.04) (0.11)
X German Leg. Or. 0.51*** -0.02
(0.03) (0.04)
X UK Leg. Or. 0.43*** -0.01
(0.02) (0.03)
X French Leg. Or. 0.80*** -0.01
(0.02) (0.03)
X Socialist Leg. Or. 0.90*** 0.01
(0.03) (0.03)
M German Leg. Or. -0.03 0.53***
(0.04) (0.03)
M UK Leg. Or. -0.03 0.46***
(0.03) (0.02)
M French Leg. Or. -0.01 0.80***
(0.03) (0.02)
M Socialist Leg. Or. -0.02 0.89***
(0.04) (0.03)
X Sign. -0.03*** -0.03*** 0.01*** 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
M Sign. -0.01** -0.01** 0.00 0.01***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
X Days 0.27* 1.00*** 0.65*** 0.01
(0.15) (0.18) (0.05) (0.05)
M Days 0.04 0.06 -0.01 0.76***
(0.16) (0.20) (0.05) (0.05)
X Polity 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.00*** 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
X Polity 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
R square 68.7% 67.0% 83.2% 83.1%
N 5474 5474 5474 5474
Table 4 (Continued)
1st stage
Country-level Gravity: Instrumental Variable Estimation
Legal Origins as Instrument
Standard errors are clustered by country pair.
variables as well as for the GDP per capita, population, and price levels in each country.
All equations have controls for the Distance, Contiguity, Colony, Common Language and Landlock 
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Baseline Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
X Corrup * Time Sens -1.38*** -1.34*** -1.18*** -1.35*** -1.36*** -1.33*** -1.36***
(0.11) (0.17) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.16) (0.18)
M Corrup * Time Sens -0.46*** 0.03 0.15 -0.08 -0.04 0.02 -0.08
(0.10) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.14) (0.16)
Skill abundance * Skill int 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.23*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.22*** 0.22***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Cap abundance * Cap int 0.13*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.11*** 0.15*** 0.25*** 0.23***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
NG abundance * NG int 0.33*** 0.27*** 0.27*** 0.29*** 0.18** 0.36*** 0.29***
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
X Sign. * Time Sens -0.10*** -0.12*** -0.09** -0.09** -0.09*** -0.06*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
M Sign. * Time Sens -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.01 -0.01 -0.04*** 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
X Days* Time Sens -1.86** -0.58 -1.89** -1.67** -1.97** -1.91**
(0.78) (0.83) (0.79) (0.81) (0.78) (0.80)
M Days* Time Sens 1.03 1.68** 1.37 1.79** 1.02 1.72**
(0.81) (0.82) (0.85) (0.83) (0.81) (0.87)
X Polity * Time Sens -0.13*** -0.10*** -0.06 -0.16*** -0.13*** -0.09**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
M Polity * Time Sens 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.09*** 0.02 0.06*** 0.07***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
X Flex. * Time Sens 4.18*** 0.00
(0.72) (0.00)
M Flex. * Time Sens 2.51*** -0.23
(0.76) (0.65)
X Fin. Devt * Time Sens 3.67*** 2.69***
(0.70) (0.50)
M Fin. Devt * Time Sens 4.39*** 2.85***
(0.28) (0.19)
X Law * Time Sens 16.81*** 0.00
(0.50) (0.00)
M Law * Time Sens 7.19*** 2.74***
(0.44) (0.42)
X Corrup *VOL -0.47 -1.40***
(0.52) (0.54)
X GDP * VOL -10.53*** -12.55***
(0.73) (0.80)
R square 50.8% 52.1% 52.1% 52.4% 52.9% 52.4% 53.4%
N 275846 234472 234472 214154 219034 234472 202007
Robustness Checks
Table 5
Corruption  as a Comparative Disadvantage in Time- Sensitive Sectors
All regressions have exporter, importer and sector fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered by country pair.
All regressions control for the gravity variables.
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Baseline
IV 1st stage IV 1st stage IV 1st stage
X X X
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
X Corrup * Time sens -1.13*** -1.58*** -1.78** -2.91***
(0.16) (0.18) (0.72) (0.36)
X Lag Corruption * Time sens 1.00***
(0.01)
X Energy Production 0.03***
(0.00)
X German Leg or * Time sens 0.38***
(0.02)
X UK Leg or * Time sens 0.53***
(0.02)
X French Leg or * Time sens 0.84***
(0.02)
X Socialist Leg or * Time sens 1.32***
(0.03)
Skill abundance * Skill int. 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.00*** 0.23*** -0.01*** 0.22*** -0.01***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Cap abundance * Cap int. 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.00*** 0.13*** 0.00*** 0.13*** 0.00***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
NG abundance * NG int. 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.00* 0.26*** 0.02*** 0.27*** 0.01***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00)
X Sign. * Time Sens. -0.09*** -0.05 0.00*** -0.03 0.08*** 0.06 0.08***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.00) (0.07) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00)
X Days* Time Sens. -1.56** -0.39 -0.10** 0.14 2.60*** 3.06*** 2.12***
(0.74) (0.76) (0.05) (1.95) (0.06) (1.13) (0.07)
X Polity * Time Sens. -0.13*** -0.16*** -0.01*** -0.17*** -0.07*** -0.25*** -0.04***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00)
R square 50.4% 50.4% 99.5% 50.4% 96.6% 50.4% 97.1%
N 293303 293303 293303 293303 293303 293303 293303
Table 6
Corruption  as a Comparative Disadvantage in Time- Sensitive Sectors
IV Estimation
IV = LegorIV = Lag corruption IV = NG production
All regressions have exporter, importer and sector fixed effects.
All equations have controls for the Distance, Contiguity, Colony, Common Language and Landlock variables.
Standard errors are clustered by country pair.
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Gravity Selection Heckman Gravity Selection Heckman
Probit Probit
xis Tis xis xis Tis xis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
X Corrup * Time sens -1.63** -0.27*** -1.68** -1.90** -0.26* -1.93**
(0.79) (0.10) (0.76) (0.97) (0.16) (0.95)
Skill abund * Skill int 0.39*** 0.02* 0.39*** 0.39*** 0.02** 0.39***
(0.07) (0.01) (0.07) (0.07) (0.01) (0.07)
Cap abund * Cap int 0.25*** -0.01 0.26*** 0.28*** -0.01 0.28***
(0.06) (0.01) (0.06) (0.06) (0.01) (0.06)
NG abund * NG int 1.28 0.15** 1.23 0.75 0.22** 0.74
(0.79) (0.08) (0.76) (0.71) (0.09) (0.70)
X Sign * Time sens 0.01 -0.03 0.00
(0.26) (0.02) (0.25)
X Days* Time sens -1.65 0.71 -0.99
(4.44) (0.86) (4.11)
X Polity * Time sens -0.21 -0.01 -0.17
(0.17) (0.02) (0.16)
Religion * Sector fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
R square 65.5% 61.5% 65.4% 61.8%
N 6031 9120 9690 5582 8094 9241
Both probit regressions include the same set of interactions.
Table 7
Corruption  as a Comparative Disadvantage in Time- Sensitive Sectors:
Effect on Selection
In the Heckman estimations in columns (3) and (6), we report the second stage only. To satisfy the exclusion 
restriction and predict selection, we use a set of interactions of the religion variable from Helpman, Melitz and 
Rubinstein (2008) with sector fixed effects.
All regressions have Exporter and Sector fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered by exporter.
The R square reported for probit regressions (2) and (4) are pseudo R squares.
For probits in columns (2) and (4) we report marginal effects, not coefficients.
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SIC code Industry Unpredictability
259 Miscellaneous Furniture and Fixtures 5.3%
301 Tires and Inner Tubes 5.7%
341 Metal Cans 6.6%
325 Structural Clay Products 7.0%
265 Paperboard Containers and Boxes 7.0%
271 Newspapers: Publishing or Publishing and Printing 7.3%
276 Manifold Business Forms 7.4%
324 Cement, Hydraulic 7.8%
345 Screw Machine Products 8.0%
295 Asphalt Paving and Roofing Materials 8.1%
384 Surgical and Medical Instruments and Apparatus 22.2%
274 Miscellaneous Publishing 22.2%
369 Miscellaneous Electrical Machinery, Equipment and Supplies 22.9%
365 Household Audio and Video Equipment 23.7%
355 Special Industry Machinery (No Metalworking Machinery) 23.9%
343 Heating Equip, Except Elec and Warm Air; and Plumbing Fixtures 24.0%
394 Dolls and Stuffed Toys 24.9%
287 Agricultural Chemicals 26.2%
283 Medicinal Chemicals and Botanical Products 34.9%
334 Secondary Smelting and Refining of Nonferrous Metals 40.3%
10 Sectors with Lowest Unpredictability Measure
10 Sectors with Highest Unpredictability Measure
Table A1
Industry Characteristics
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M X M and X
(1) (2) (3)
X corruption -0.36***
(0.03)
M corruption -0.09***
(0.03)
M or X has high corruption -0.23**
(0.10)
ln(XGDPpc) 1.27***
(0.05)
ln(MGDPPC) 0.89***
(0.04)
ln(Xpop) 1.03***
(0.02)
ln(Mpop) 0.77***
(0.02)
Distance -1.13*** -1.04*** -1.22***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Contiguity 0.77*** 0.60*** 0.52***
(0.13) (0.14) (0.15)
Colony 0.87*** 0.83*** 0.87***
(0.09) (0.10) (0.11)
Common Language 0.58*** 0.76*** 0.72***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
X Landlocked -0.05
(0.05)
M landlocked -0.56***
(0.05)
One landlocked -0.54***
(0.13)
X Signatures to export -0.04***
(0.00)
M Signatures to import -0.01***
(0.00)
X Days to start a business 0.20
(0.12)
M Days to start a business 0.17
(0.13)
X Polity 0.00
(0.00)
X Polity 0.00
(0.01)
X Labor Flex
M Labor Flex
X Fin. Devt
M Fin. Devt
X Rule of Law
M Rule of Law
X ln(price level) 0.13**
(0.05)
M ln(price level) 0.78***
(0.05)
Exporter fixed effects No Yes Yes
Importer fixed effects Yes No Yes
R square 69.4% 73.4% 78.0%
N 9071 8376 8333
Fixed Effects
Table A2
Country-level Gravity Equation:
Fixed-effect Specifications
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Benchmark
Restricted IV IV
Sample lnX X Corr. M Corr. lnX X Corr. M Corr.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
X corruption -0.46*** -1.05*** -0.32*
(0.04) (0.09) (0.19)
M corruption -0.09** -0.01 0.14
(0.04) (0.09) (0.19)
X German Leg. Or. 0.50*** -0.02 0.47*** -0.01
(0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03)
X UK Leg. Or. 0.44*** -0.01 0.35*** 0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
X French Leg. Or. 0.88*** -0.01 0.35*** 0.00
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
X Socialist Leg. Or. 0.90*** 0.02 0.57*** 0.00
(0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03)
M German Leg. Or. -0.03 0.51*** 0.00 0.49***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
M UK Leg. Or. -0.02 0.50*** 0.03 0.38***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
M French Leg. Or. -0.01 0.91*** 0.01 0.39***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
M Socialist Leg. Or. -0.02 0.92*** -0.02 0.59***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
X Signatures to export -0.03*** -0.04*** 0.00** 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
M Signatures to import -0.01** -0.01*** 0.00 0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
X Days to start a business 0.27* 0.96*** -0.15*** 0.01
(0.15) (0.18) (0.04) (0.04)
M Days to start a business 0.04 0.52*** 0.00 -0.08*
(0.16) (0.18) (0.04) (0.04)
X Polity 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.00*** 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
X Polity 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Second set of Controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes
R square 68.7% # 66.8% 82.5% 82.0% 73.9% 91.4% 91.3%
N 5474 # 5474 5474 5474 5370 5370 5370
as well as for the GDP per capita, population, and price levels in each country.
Table A3
Country-level Gravity: Instrumental Variable Estimation
Legal Origins as InstrumentLegal Origins as Instrument
1st stage 1st stage
Standard errors are clustered by country pair.
All equations have controls for the Distance, Contiguity, Colony, Common Language and Landlock variables 
Alternative Sets of Controls for Legal Origins Instrument
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